OPTIMIZING CONTRACT INTERACTIONS IN THE PERENNIAL PLANTING SEGMENT

Issue № 6, 2026, article № 24, pages 270-276

Section:

Language: Russian

Original language title: ОПТИМИЗАЦИЯ КОНТРАКТНЫХ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЙ В СЕГМЕНТЕ МНОГОЛЕТНИХ НАСАЖДЕНИЙ

Keywords: AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, VITICULTURE, LONG-TERM CONTRACTS, CONTRACTUAL INTERACTIONS, PERENNIAL CROPS, OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR, FRUIT GROWING, RISK SHARING, STABILITY OF INTERACTIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS

Abstract: The relevance of this study stems from the need to improve the stability and predictability of contractual relationships in fruit growing and viticulture, where the long investment cycle for establishing perennial plantings (3-5 years before fruiting, 10-12 years until full return on investment) creates increased risks of opportunistic behavior by counterparties. The problem lies in the lack of standardized contracts that take into account plant phenology and risk distribution, as well as the insufficient prevalence of long-term forms of cooperation with the processor's participation in investment costs. The aim of the study is to develop a theoretically substantiated and empirically verified model for optimizing contractual interactions in the perennial cropping segment using fruit growing and viticulture as an example. The research methodology is based on neoinstitutional contract theory (transaction costs, opportunistic behavior), formalized interview methods, comparative and statistical analysis (Student's t-test) using data from 47 farms in Krasnodar Krai, the Republic of Crimea, and Rostov Oblast, as well as an analysis of 23 existing contracts. As a result, three types of contracts were identified (spot contracts – 51%, short-term contracts for 1-3 years – 32%, long-term contracts with investment participation – 17%), and interaction stability indicators (0.61; 0.84; 0.93, respectively) and the frequency of serious violations (87%, 53%, 12%) were identified. A system of criteria for assessing the effectiveness of contracts for perennial crops is substantiated, incorporating economic, institutional, and agronomic groups of indicators. Key finding: long-term contracts with processor participation in investment costs (coverage ratio of 0.25-0.48) demonstrate maximum stability and minimal opportunistic behavior. However, their widespread adoption is hampered by the lack of standard forms, low trust between the parties, and a shortage of long-term financing.

Authors: Suglobov Alexander Evgenievich