INSTITUTIONAL MODELS AND FORECASTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Issue № 5, 2026, article № 24, pages 246-257

Section:

Language: Russian

Original language title: ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ МОДЕЛИ И ПРОГНОЗЫ РАЗВИТИЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ КОНТРАКТНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ В РОССИЙСКОМ АГРОПРОМЫШЛЕННОМ КОМПЛЕКСЕ

Keywords: INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS, AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, INSTITUTIONAL MODELS, INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, HOLD-UP PROBLEM, ASSET SPECIFICITY, STATE SUPPORT, SANCTIONS RISKS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, STRUCTURAL ADAPTATION

Abstract: Under increasing geo-economic uncertainty and institutional transformation, international contractual relations in the Russian agro-industrial complex (AIC) have acquired strategic importance. Contract incompleteness, high asset specificity, and sanctions-related constraints intensify opportunistic risks and require institutional design of sustainable cooperation models. The study applies an interdisciplinary approach based on institutional theory and incomplete contract theory. A dynamic structural adaptation model is developed to forecast institutional shifts, incorporating profitability, institutional risk, transaction costs, state support, and asset specificity. The model is implemented through a discrete replicator dynamic with calibrated sensitivity parameters. Four institutional models of international contracting are identified and compared: export-oriented raw-material model, technologically dependent contracts, joint investment projects, and alternative jurisdiction model. Utility calculations demonstrate the dominance of the export-oriented model, while joint investment projects show the highest long-term development potential. Scenario analysis indicates that increased sanctions strengthen alternative jurisdictions, whereas expanded state support stimulates cooperative and higher value-added forms of contracting. The findings suggest a gradual institutional shift from raw-material specialization toward more complex cooperative forms, contingent upon active state policy. The evolution of international contractual relations in the Russian AIC is driven not only by market conditions but primarily by institutional design and risk allocation mechanisms under contract incompleteness.

Authors: Suglobov Alexander Evgenievich, Lyasnikov Nikolay Vasilyevich