INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC MODELLING OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS IN RUSSIA’S GRAIN SECTOR UNDER PRICE AND SANCTIONS SHOCKS

Issue № 3, 2026, article № 23, pages 240-250

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Language: Russian

Original language title: ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЕ КОНТРАКТНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ В ЗЕРНОВОМ СЕКТОРЕ РОССИИ В УСЛОВИЯХ ЦЕНОВЫХ И САНКЦИОННЫХ ШОКОВ

Keywords: HOLD‑UP, SIDE‑SELLING, COVAR, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS, GRAIN SECTOR, RUSSIAN AGRI‑FOOD COMPLEX, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, PRICE VOLATILITY, SANCTIONS, SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE, CONTRACT DIGITALIZATION

Abstract: The article is devoted to an institutional and economic analysis of contractual relations in Russia’s grain sector under conditions of price volatility and sanctions‑induced shocks. It develops a model grounded in the new institutional economics and the global value chain framework, linking the quality of law enforcement, market structure, price and logistics shocks, as well as elements of contract design (type of pricing formula, third‑party guarantees, tied credit) to farms’ choice of formal contracts, the risk of side‑selling, and the resilience of supply chains. The paper proposes a set of estimable relationships in the form of a logit model of the probability of contracting, a threshold model of side‑selling risk, and an aggregate resilience index, based on FAO and Rosstat statistics and recent studies on extreme risks and the financing of export operations.

Authors: Suglobov Alexander Evgenievich